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This study estimates the effects of a state merit aid program on community colleges by using the 
introduction of the Florida Bright Futures Scholarship program as a natural experiment. It 
examines the effects of the program in terms of institutional aid, tuition pricing, and as a re-
sorting mechanism for high ability students. The results suggest that community colleges do not 
increase students’ charges to capture additional revenues, nor do they substitute state aid for 
institutional aid. Contrary to what was expected, institutions apparently use the scholarship 
program as an ―ability marker‖ to provide additional financial aid to high ability students. 
Although we find no statistical evidence that the community college system is losing high ability 
students, there is strong support for heterogeneity in the program effect across institutions that 
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Financial aid and the cost of college are among the most studied topics in the economics 
of higher education because of their policy relevance (Heller, 1997; Kane, 1999; Leslie & 
Brinkman, 1987). Economic theory suggests that financial aid can help reduce imperfections in 
the capital markets for financing of higher education and ease financial constraints for 
individuals wishing to go to college, therefore inducing individuals to invest in higher education 
at a more optimal level (Long, 2004a). For years, state financial aid policies have focused on 
need-based aid programs to reduce inequalities in access and completion in higher education. 
However, during the last 15 years and starting with the Georgia HOPE scholarship, many states 
have shifted their financial aid policies toward broad-based merit aid programs (Dynarski, 2004). 
Although merit-based financial aid programs have positive effects in terms of access (Cornwell, 
Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2003, 2004; Kane, 2003), they also encourage grade 
inflation in high school (Henry & Rubenstein, 2002; Office of Program Policy and Government 
Accountability [OPPAGA], 2003) and provide incentives for college students to enroll in fewer 
and easier courses, to withdraw from classes, and to increase summer school credits (Cornwell, 
Kyung, & Mustard, 2005). Thus, although the new merit aid programs seem to increase the 
probability of enrolling in higher education, they also lead to student behavioral responses that 
partially undermine their objective of promoting academic achievement. 
The implementation of new financial aid programs may also provide postsecondary 
institutions with incentives to alter the way they operate, particularly in increasingly difficult and 
competitive funding environments. Long (2004a) outlined three main possible responses to the 
introduction of financial aid policies by postsecondary institutions. First, most colleges and 
universities determine the amount of institutional aid they give by subtracting from the 
institutional cost of education all the aid that a student receives. Thus, the crowding-out 
hypothesis states that colleges are likely to reduce the amount of institutional aid they provide 
when a new source of financial aid becomes available, thereby capturing the rents from the new 
program (Kane, 2003). Second, institutions may increase students’ charges, such as tuition, room 
and board, or fees, in order to capture the rents from the new program. This argument was first 
stated almost 20 years ago by former Secretary of Education William Bennett and is also known 
as the Bennett hypothesis (Bennett, 1987). These two hypotheses are fully explored below. A 
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third hypothesis, which was cited by Long but is not discussed in this study for reasons explained 
in the next section, is that institutions may reduce quality-enhancing investments, such as 
instructional expenditures, if the new financial aid program gives them a competitive advantage 
over out-of-state schools. 
Although community colleges currently enroll almost half of all the students in higher 
education (National Center for Education Statistics, 2006), previous research has been limited to 
four-year colleges and universities. In this study, we test whether two-year public colleges 
respond to the introduction of a new state merit based financial aid program in the ways that 
Long (2004a) predicted they should respond. In 1997, the Florida Legislature created the Florida 
Bright Futures Scholarship (FBFS) program, funded by lottery funds. We use a unique 
administrative dataset obtained from the Florida Department of Education to evaluate 
community colleges’ institutional behavior before and after this financial aid program was 
implemented.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the FBFS 
program and hypothesize its impact on community colleges and these institutions’ potential 
responses to the economic incentives generated by the program. In section 3, we describe the 
dataset and the difference-in-difference empirical model used to estimate institutional responses 
to FBFS. We discuss our findings in section 4, and we present concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
 
2. The Florida Bright Futures Scholarship and Its Effects on Community Colleges 
In 1997, the Florida Legislature created the Florida Bright Futures Scholarship program. 
Funded by state lottery funds, it rewards traditional-age students for their academic achievements 
during high school by helping to finance their postsecondary education in the state of Florida. 
Traditional-age students are defined as those who matriculate at any Florida college in the fall 
term of the same year in which they graduated from high school. Students, who must also be 
Florida residents, apply for an FBFS by completing the Florida Financial Aid Application 
(FFAA) during their last year in high school (Office of Student Financial Assistance, 2004). This 
scholarship is awarded independent of a student’s financial situation. The Bright Futures 
program therefore intends to encourage better student preparation and performance, make 
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college more affordable, and encourage more students to attend an in-state college (OPPAGA, 
2003). 
The FBFS program provides four types of awards: Florida Academic Top Scholars 
Award (FATS), the Florida Academic Scholarship (FAS), the Florida Medallion Scholarship 
(FMS), and the Florida Gold Seal Vocational Scholarship (FGSV). The first three can be used at 
any of the state’s public and private degree granting institutions; the latter is reserved for 
students who pursue vocational/technical postsecondary education. In order to receive a FBFS, 
students must satisfy minimum high school GPA and ACT/SAT test scores. The minimum 
requirements vary according to the type of FBFS award received. For example, in order to 
receive an FAS, students must have a 3.5 high school GPA, score 1270 on the SAT or 28 on the 
ACT, and have at least 75 hours of community service while in high school. The minimum 
requirements are similar for the FATS, but less strict for the remaining two types of FBFS 
awards (Heller & Rasmussen, 2002). Once in college, recipients need to maintain a minimum 
GPA to renew their FBFS, which also varies according to the type of award, and they must enroll 
for a minimum of six non-remedial semester hours per term (Office of Student Financial 
Assistance, 2004). 
Although one might expect that a merit aid program like FBFS affects mostly four-year 
college students, FBFS provides awards to a considerable number of community college 
students. Over 140,000 students received a scholarship for the 2005-2006 academic year for a 
total over $306 million; 18 percent of the recipients students used theirs at a community college 
or private two-year institution (Office of Student Financial Assistance, 2006). 
How do we expect community colleges to respond to these additional funds available 
from FBFS? As discussed above, Long (2004a) outlined three main possible responses of 
colleges to new financial aid programs. Certainly, public two-year colleges could capture the 
rents from the new financial aid source by reducing the amount of institutional aid they provide 
as the crowding-out hypothesis predicts, and then redistribute the surplus among non-eligible 
students or reallocate it for other purposes. We test the crowding-out hypothesis below.  
Public two year colleges could also capture the rents from FBFS by increasing tuition and 
fees. However, tuition at public colleges is generally determined after negotiation with the State 
Legislature, which limits their institutional freedom to modify tuition and fees in response to a 
new financial aid program (Long, 2002). This limited flexibility restricts the applicability of the 
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Bennett hypothesis at public colleges. Moreover, the democratic mission of community colleges 
might deter the colleges from increasing student charges even if they were able to do so. In 
Florida, each community college’s board of trustees establishes tuition and fees, but they cannot 
be more than 15 percent above or 10 percent below the combined total of the fee schedule 
adopted by the State Legislature and the technology fee adopted by a board of trustees (2005 
Florida Statutes, Title XLVIII, Chapter 1009, 1009.23). We therefore test whether community 
colleges in Florida responded to FBFS by exploiting this limited flexibility for increasing tuition 
as the Bennett hypothesis predicts.   
Lastly, out-of-state competition is not a major threat for community colleges because 
they generally serve students who live within a reasonable commuting distance (Rouse, 1994, 
1995). Only 5.8 percent of students in our dataset are out-of-state students, suggesting that 
Florida community colleges attract mostly in-state students. Moreover, only 4 out of Florida’s 28 
community colleges are located within 20 miles of state borders and in direct geographic 
competition with out-of-state colleges. Because of the limited applicability of the competitive 
advantage hypothesis to community colleges, we do not test it in this study.  
There are, however, additional ways in which a new merit aid program could impact 
community colleges. These alternative hypotheses have not been discussed in the literature 
because, in contrast to this study, previous research has not focused exclusively on two-year 
colleges. First, traditional-age students could modify their college choice decision and enroll in a 
four-year college instead of a two-year institution (Dynarski, 2004). Indeed, the most generous 
versions of the Bright Futures program, the FATS and the FAS, provide full tuition and fees 
coverage at any Florida public postsecondary institution—or 100 percent of tuition at a 
comparable public institution if the student enrolls at a private college. Less generous versions, 
like the FMS and the FGSV, cover 75 percent of tuition and fees.
1
 Therefore, students eligible 
for these scholarships are likely to choose a four-year over a two-year college because FBFS 
decreases the cost of a four-year college relative to a two-year college. More importantly, given 
the merit component of the program, high ability students who otherwise would have attended a 
community college may instead consider enrollment at a four-year college. This re-sorting 
hypothesis or ―moving up‖ effect preoccupies community college advocates because it may 
                                                 
1
 The 2006 Florida Legislature has since amended section 1009.535, Florida Statute; beginning in fall 2006, FMS 
students who choose to attend a Florida public community college may receive an award of 100 percent of their 
tuition and fees for college credit courses leading toward an associate degree. 
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decrease the average quality of students enrolled at community colleges, and may ultimately 
have a negative impact on the college’s already low retention and graduation rates. 
A second alternative hypothesis is that state-level effects as previously estimated in the 
literature (e.g., Long 2002, 2004a) mask fundamental variation in responses across institutions. 
For example, public two-year colleges receive the bulk of their funding from state appropriations 
and local tax revenues, but they have been exposed to an increasingly difficult funding 
environment where other demands on state resources, such as health care and corrections 
facilities, have squeezed community college funding in many states (Kane, Orszag & Gunter, 
2003). Certainly, as shown in Figure 1, this national trend was clearly evident in Florida in the 
late 1980s, although state revenues rebounded during the 1990s. Similarly, institutional 
responses might be a function of educational marketplace where each community college is 
located. We also contribute to the literature by explaining how different institutional factors have 
an effect on the response of each community college to this new merit aid program. 
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Figure 1:  
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Fiscal Year
Total Budget State Revenues
Tuition and Fees Lottery Funds
Source: Florida Department of Education. Author's calculations (2006). Values per FTE in $2002
Vertical line shows when Bright Futures was introduced (year 1997)
 
 
In sum, our study investigates the impact of FBFS on community colleges and their  
responses to the new economic incentives created by it. In particular, we test the applicability of 
the crowding-out, Bennett, and re-sorting hypotheses for community colleges after teasing out 
potentially confounding factors such as the trend in state appropriations and the behavior of four-
year institutions.
2
 Moreover, our detailed micro dataset allows us to test the assumption of 
homogeneous program effect and to show that previous state-level program effect estimates 
mask fundamental variation in responses across institutions. 
 
                                                 
2
 Community colleges may be affected by changes occurring in the public four-year sector. For example, increases 
in the slots available in the Florida State University System (FSUS) could decrease the demand for two-year 
colleges, especially among traditional-age students, an effect that might be confounded with the behavioral response 
of community colleges to the introduction of FBFS program. 
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3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Dataset and Variables 
For this study, we rely on a unique administrative dataset obtained from the Florida 
Department of Education. It includes transcript records of all Florida resident
3
 first-time, degree-
seeking community college students who enrolled in a college-credit course at any of Florida’s 
28 community colleges in the fall of years 1995 to 2000,
4
 which covers the period before and 
after the implementation of the FBFS program.  
The dataset includes the amount, type, and source of financial aid received by each 
student in the first semester of college, and each student’s college placement test scores.
5
 The 
dataset also contains information on the demographic characteristics of all students in each 
cohort, including gender, race/ethnicity, citizenship, and English language proficiency. In 
addition, we obtained Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) codes for the 28 
Florida community colleges, and thus our dataset has been merged with the IPEDS dataset. 
IPEDS is a set of annual surveys collected by the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES), designed to be an annual census of all primary providers of postsecondary education in 
the United States. From IPEDS, we extracted tuition information for two- and four-year colleges 
located in Florida, enrollment rates at Florida four-year institutions, and ZIP codes to compute 
distances between institutions. The dataset is supplemented with information on high school 
graduates, community colleges’ revenues, and enrollment at four-year colleges obtained directly 
from the Florida Department of Education, Division of Community Colleges. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
We used the introduction of the FBFS program as a source for a natural experiment and a 
difference-in-difference regression to estimate its causal effect on different measures of 
community colleges’ institutional behavior (Campbell & Stanley, 1990; Meyer, 1995). In order 
to identify the FBFS program effect, we took advantage of the fact that FBFS is open only to 
                                                 
3
 Since FBFS is not available to non-residents and fee policies for non-resident students are quite different from 
those for in-state students, out-of-state students are excluded from the dataset (5.8 percent of total sample). 
4
 Currently, 7 of these 28 colleges have been granted permission to offer bachelor’s degrees. The colleges were all 
considered community colleges during the time frame covered by this study. 
5
 We do not have all necessary information to determine which type of FBFS award each student received. 
Therefore, we cannot estimate the effects of the four FBFS awards separately. 
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traditional students—those who matriculate at any Florida community college in the fall term of 
the same year in which they graduated from high school. Since this type of aid was not available 
to traditional students before the implementation of FBFS, we identified the FBFS effect by 
analyzing traditional students before and after the introduction of the program.  
We defined traditional-age students as those students who were younger than age 19 by 
the time they entered college, or were the same age at college entrance as at high school 
graduation. Florida resident students who delayed enrollment form a natural within-state control 
group because they were exposed to similar trends and economic shocks as the treatment group. 
To create a valid comparison group, we restricted our control group to those Florida resident 
students who were younger than age 25—but older than age 19—when they entered college.
6
 
However, the fact that they delayed college entry suggests they were somewhat different from 
our treatment group, and therefore our baseline models control for a detailed set of observable 





ji2i1iiijt 'ZXDTradAFTERTradAFTERy     (1) 
where yijt is the outcome of interest, such as the amount of institutional financial aid, in-state 
tuition, or the student’s test scores, for student i in academic year t (t = 95, 96, … , 2001) 
enrolled in community college j (j = 1, 2 , … , 28); AFTERi is an indicator that is set to 1 for 
students who matriculated after 1997; Tradi is a dummy for traditional student and equals 1 for 
those who started college right after their high school graduation; Dj is a set of dummy variables 
indicating whether a student is enrolled in community college j; Xi contains student’s 
characteristics and a continuous variable measuring the time trend; Z is a set of variables 
measuring state-level trends in revenues for community colleges, average institutional test 
scores, and enrollment and tuition at four-year colleges; and ijt  is the error term.
7
  
The program effect is captured by the coefficient on ii TradAFTER  , the interaction 
between enrollment after the introduction of the Bright Futures program (AFTERi) and the 
traditional-age student (Tradi) dummies. This coefficient measures the state-level weighted 
                                                 
6
 Strictly speaking, the higher education literature considers ―non-traditional‖ students as those older than 25 years, 
generally attending part time and working full time while enrolled, married, caring for children, and/or financially 
independent. For the purposes of this paper, however, we consider non-traditional students as those who delayed 
enrollment, and we exclude ―older students‖ (25 years or older) to create a more homogeneous control group in 
terms of enrollment trends and pathways (Calcagno, Crosta, Bailey, & Jenkins, in press; Turner, 2004). 
7
 All difference-in-difference regressions are adjusted using clustering methods (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 
2004). 
 9 
average of institutional responses to the introduction of FBFS. The identifying assumption is that 
any relative shift in the outcomes of interest is attributable to the introduction of FBFS. The 
coefficient α1 removes any effect that is common to both traditional and non-traditional students 
after the implementation of FBFS, while α2 removes any effect of being a traditional-age student 
before and after the introduction of the FBFS program. 
Microdata allowed us to test heterogeneity in the program effect across institutions, or the 
behavioral responses of each community college to the introduction of a new state merit aid 
program. We followed a two-step multilevel model (Gelman & Hill, 2006). First, we captured 
the average program effect at each institution by adding a triple-interaction between the 
community college dummies (Dj), the enrollment after the Bright Futures indicator (AFTERi), 







jiijijt 'ZXDTradAFTERDTradAFTERy    (2) 
where j  are 28 institution-specific program effects (one set equal to 0). In the second step, we 
performed a linear regression at the institutional level using these estimated coefficients as 
dependent variables and different institutional-level factors as predictors. Since this second step 
has only 28 data points, we tested the impact of institutional factors on program effects as a set 




4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the variables we used in the analysis. Regardless of the merit aid 
policy, traditional-age students received more institutional financial aid than those who delayed 
enrollment. As expected, the average amount of institutional aid in 2002 dollars decreased for 
traditional-age students after the implementation of the FBFS, although only slightly. However, 
the average amount of institutional aid also decreased for non-traditional students, suggesting a 
statewide decreasing trend in institutional financial aid. Traditional-age students had higher test 
scores, especially in the math section of the SAT, and were also more likely than non-traditional 
students to be female and White, to hold U.S. citizenship, and to be fluent in English both before 
and after the implementation of FBFS. We used a detailed set of observable characteristics in the 
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regressions to control for pre-college differences between traditional-age and non-traditional 
students.  
 
Table 1:  
Sample Means Before and After Bright Futures for Traditional and Non-Traditional 
Community College Students 
 
Variable 
Before BF: 1995-1996 After BF: 1997-2000 
Traditional Non-traditional Traditional Non-traditional 
Institutional aid 195.62 126.84 189.44 112.41 
 (453.99) (378.44) (447.68) (340.53) 
In-state tuition 1,332.36 1,336.32 1,333.74 1,334.17 
 (103.72) (102.54) (160.98) (155.70) 
SAT converted math 417.85 364.99 425.04 373.76 
 (93.32) (94.13) (90.35) (93.43) 
SAT converted verbal 441.52 420.00 457.01 438.15 
 (91.22) (99.67) (88.86) (98.98) 
Age 17.80 20.08 17.86 20.07 
 (0.44) (1.53) (0.39) (1.50) 
Female 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.47 
Asian 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Black 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.19 
Hispanic 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.19 
American Indian 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
US citizen 0.90 0.83 0.93 0.87 
Limited English proficiency 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.06 
State revenues per FTE 2,670.14 2,668.90 3,112.91 3,112.21 
 (337.78) (311.69) (465.24) (441.43) 
FTE enrollments FSUS 130,008.80 143,472.90 
 (1,012.98) (6,144.11) 
Tuition FSUS 2,076.75 2,328.65 
 (22.88) (143.53) 
Observations 26,220 12,083 69,698 34,687 
          
 Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Florida Department of Education and IPEDS.  
 Notes: standard deviation for continuous variables in parentheses. Monetary values are expressed in 
2002 dollars. 
 
As expected, state-level trends were different before and after the introduction of the 
FBFS. Table 1 confirms the pattern shown in Figure 1: State appropriations for community 
colleges decreased during the 1980s, but they experienced a rebound in the 1990s. In addition, 
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the total number of slots in the Florida State University System (FSUS) and FSUS’s average 
tuition increased after the introduction of the FBFS, pointing to the importance of controlling for 
these trends at the four-year level.  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on institutional level characteristics and measures of 
the level of competition within the educational marketplace. The average distance to the closest 
four-year public college was 31 miles, although the average number of four-year institutions 
within a 50-mile radius was seven. Moreover, an average community college in Florida faced 
competition from 11 postsecondary education institutions within a radius of 50 miles. This 
appears to suggest that, on average, the educational marketplace of Florida community colleges 
is quite competitive. The average institution enrolled 8,500 full-time equivalent (FTE) students 
and managed an annual budget of $5,000 per FTE student over the years 1995 to 2000, with 
$3,281 of these funds coming from the state as appropriations.  
 
Table 2:  
Sample Means for Institutional Characteristics 
 
Variable Mean 
Distance to closest 4-year public college 
31.76 
(24.96) 
Number of public 4-year institutions in 50-mile radius 
1.25 
(0.88) 
Number of 4-year institutions in 50-mile radius 
6.9 
(6.43) 
Number of postsecondary institutions in 50-mile radius 
10.96 
(9.13) 
Total FTE students (per 1,000) 
8.53 
(8.02) 
Mean state revenues per FTE (1995-2000, CPI adjusted) 
3281.40 
(737.22) 




    
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Florida Department of Education and IPEDS.  
Notes: Standard deviation for continuous variables in parentheses. Monetary values are 




4.2 Regression Results 
Table 3 shows the evidence for the crowding-out hypothesis in Florida community 
colleges using the amount of institutional financial aid as the dependent variable. We began with 
a model that includes the direct effects, the treatment interaction, institutional fixed effects, 
demographic controls, and a time trend (column 1). Then covariates were sequentially introduced 
into the model to test for confounding factors (columns 2-5). In contrast to the crowding-out 
hypothesis, community colleges in Florida seem to have increased institutional financial aid after 
the implementation of the FBFS program. As mentioned earlier, the most generous versions of 
the state merit aid program cover 100 percent of tuition, whereas the less generous versions 
cover only 75 percent of tuition. Awarding students who received 75 percent of their costs in 
scholarship funds the remaining 25 percent gives community colleges an advantage in recruiting 
good students. Not only do FBFS awards serve as an ―ability marker‖ to institutions—indicating 
which are the higher ability students—but they also give colleges an important tool for 
competing: it makes them more attractive financially to high ability students. While traditional-
age students had initially received higher amounts of institutional aid than non-traditional 
students (coefficient on traditional-age students), the FBFS program further increased the amount 
of institutional aid that traditional students received. The pattern held after controlling for several 
potentially confounding factors (columns 2-5).
8
 Moreover, we found a negative effect that is 
common to both traditional and non-traditional students after the implementation of FBFS that 
confirms the statewide decreasing trend in institutional aid found in Table 1, although this result 
becomes statistically significant only after controlling for the trend in enrollments at FSUS.  
                                                 
8
 All regression results are also robust to changes in transition or participation rates (measured by the changes in the 
number of high school graduates who enroll in college) and to changes in the number of students taking AP exams. 
Results are not shown here but are available from the authors upon request.      
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Table 3: 
Difference-in-Difference Results Using Institutional Aid as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
After BF * Traditional 11.843** 11.827** 12.030** 11.531** 11.533** 
 (5.028) (5.028) (5.009) (5.001) (5.003) 
Traditional 18yrs 35.312*** 35.167*** 34.648*** 35.064*** 35.062*** 
 (4.377) (4.376) (4.351) (4.345) (4.345) 
After Bright Futures 7.542 0.321 -2.788 -12.758** -12.735** 
 (5.026) (5.218) (5.222) (5.740) (5.748) 
Institutional dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Demographic controls 
and time trend 
YES YES YES YES YES 
     
State revenues per FTE 
 YES YES YES YES 
     
Institutional mean for test 
scores 
  YES YES YES 
     
FTE enrollments FSUS    YES YES 
      
Tuition FSUS     YES 
      
R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.186 
      
Observations 142,680 142,680 142,680 142,680 142,680 
            
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Monetary values are expressed in 2002 dollars. Demographic controls include gender, 
race/ethnicity, citizenship, limited English proficiency, verbal and math test scores. 
 
Several robustness checks were conducted to test the assumptions of our difference-in-
difference model. First, although we controlled for observable differences between the treatment 
and control groups, non-traditional students might be affected differently by ―environmental 
factors‖ that are unobservable to the econometrician. These unobserved environmental factors 
could ultimately affect non-traditional students’ enrollment decisions differently over time (Bean 
& Metzner, 1985).
9
 Thus, as shown in Table 4, we tested the sensitivity of the estimates to our 
decision to include students who were younger than 25 years old when they entered college. The 
                                                 
9
 In the Florida dataset, the trend in enrollment rates for non-traditional (traditional) students remained pretty flat, 
ranging from 32 (68) percent in 1995 to 34 (66) percent in 2000. The trend also remained stable if we included in 
our ―non-traditional‖ group those students who were older than 25 years old.  
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results are quite stable after restricting the control group to only those students younger than age 
24, 23, and 22 years old, respectively. Second, Table 4 indicates that there are no significant 
changes in the treatment estimators when we focused on years closer to the implementation of 
the policy (1996 and 1997, 1995 to 1998), although estimates slightly increase in size. Third, we 
estimated the same model but using a related outcome that is not supposed to have been affected 
by FBFS (amount of federal financial aid) and an outcome that should have been directly 
affected by the policy (amount of state financial aid). As expected, FBFS had no statistical effect 
on the amount of federal aid (Table 4, column 2), while the effect of the policy in column 3 
further confirms the robustness of the results.  
 
Table 4: 
Sensitivity of Results to Choice of Control Group and Years 
 
 Selected subsamples 
Dependent variable 
Institutional aid Federal aid State aid 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Baseline: control group is < 25 
years old; All years (1995 to 
2000)  
11.843** -2.239 20.713***    
(5.028) (10.297) (3.364) 
Control group: < 24 years old 
9.843** -2.050    19.706*** 
(4.95) (10.391) (3.403) 
Control group < 23 years old 
10.485** 1.891    19.965*** 
(5.078) (10.531) (3.480) 
Control group < 22 years old 
9.972* 5.046      20.124***  
(5.251) (10.634) (3.569) 
Years 1996 and 1997 
18.962** 7.581 15.036*** 
(7.786) (15.414) (5.379) 
Years 1995 to 1998  
15.941*** 8.849 16.669*** 
(5.624) (11.509) (3.757) 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Monetary values are expressed in 2002 dollars. Baseline results for column 1 come 
from table 3, column 1. 
 
However, these state weighted average estimates mask the institution-specific responses 
to the FBFS program. To estimate institutional-specific responses, we interacted the treatment 
effect with each institutional indicator as explained in equation 2. Figure 2 shows the 
institutional treatment effect, the 1 standard error bounds, the weighted average (11.533, as 
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shown on column 5 of Table 3), and the no effect line set to equal 0. Confidence intervals that 
touch the no effect line at 0 are not statistically significant at a five percent level. Institutional 
treatment effects were plotted against institutional size as measured by the total number of FTE 
students.
10
 As expected, the graph shows heterogeneous responses across institutions. Some 
institutions increased their first semester level of institutional aid by amounts as high as $250, 
while others decreased it by amounts as low as $100. Interestingly, the largest responses appear 
to have come from the smallest institutions—although these estimates have larger standard errors 




                                                 
10
 Note that institutional size here is measured as the total number of FTE students from IPEDS. This information is 
more broadly defined than any other measure of institutional size that we can obtain from a more limited dataset of 
first-time, degree seeking, resident students in our sample.  
11
 This result, however, could be related to the volatility inherent to small institutions, where the impact of an 
individual student is considerably larger than that at a large institution (Gelman & Hill, 2006; Kane & Staiger, 
2002).    
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Figure 2: 
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Note: Dependent variable is institutional financial aid. No effect line is set at 0. The weighted average 
comes from table 2, column 5. Institutional treatment effects are estimated according to equation 2. 
Confidence intervals that touch the no effect line at 0 are not statistically significant at a 5 percent 
level ( 1 standard error). 
 
We then tested the applicability of the Bennett hypothesis in Florida community colleges. 
Table 5 shows the regression results using in-state tuition as the dependent variable following the 
same sequential models previously described. The effect of the FBFS program on in-state tuition 
is identified by between-institution variation, because tuition is an institutional level variable 
with a small within-institution variation over time (in 2002 dollars). Although public 
postsecondary institutions in Florida do not have much institutional freedom to modify their 
tuition, we found a statistically significant effect of around a $5 increase in tuition. Nonetheless, 
this result is economically minor given a pre-policy average tuition of $1,300, and its detection is 
an artifact of large sample size power. Moreover, the statistical difference vanished after 
controlling for the trend in tuition at the FSUS, suggesting an increasing trend at all Florida 
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public postsecondary institutions. This result in Florida community colleges confirms previous 
evidence found for two-year colleges in Georgia (Long, 2002).  
 
Table 5: 
Difference-in-Difference Results Using In-State Tuition as Dependent Variable 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
After BF * Traditional 4.876*** 4.890*** 5.139*** 4.562*** 1.587 
 (1.316) (1.315) (1.293) (1.271) (1.146) 
Traditional 18yrs -3.460*** -3.482*** -4.601*** -4.164*** -1.821** 
 (1.022) (1.021) (1.002) (0.970) (0.912) 
After Bright Futures 163.924*** 161.115*** 164.085*** 154.246*** 130.148*** 
 (1.383) (1.404) (1.371) (1.413) (1.330) 
Demographic controls 
and time trend 
YES YES YES YES YES 
     
State revenues per FTE 
 YES YES YES YES 
     
Institutional mean for test 
scores 
  YES YES YES 
     
FTE enrollments FSUS    YES YES 
      
Tuition FSUS     YES 
      
R-squared 0.139 0.140 0.162 0.163 0.376 
      
Observations 142,680 142,680 142,680 142,680 142,680 
            
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Monetary values are expressed in 2002 dollars. Demographic controls include gender, 
race/ethnicity, citizenship, limited English proficiency, verbal and math test scores.  
 
Finally, as shown in Table 6, we tested the re-sorting hypothesis using math and verbal 
test scores as dependent variables. As already stated, the most generous state merit aid programs 
award 100 percent of tuition and therefore could serve as incentives to students to change their 
postsecondary education choice. High ability traditional-age students under financial pressure 
may have decided to attend the less expensive two-year institutions before the creation of FBFS, 
but the program decreased the cost of a four-year college relative to a two-year college within the 
state. Hence, if high-test-scores students re-sort toward four-year colleges, we would expect to 
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observe a decrease in the average cognitive ability of students at community colleges after the 
establishment of the FBFS. Results on the treatment interaction for traditional students in math 
and English test scores did not confirm this hypothesis, however. The effects for traditional 




Difference-in-Difference Results Using Test Scores as Dependent Variables 
 
Variable 
Math Verbal Math Verbal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
After BF * Traditional -1.512 -0.997 -1.251 0.032 
 (1.176) (1.186) (1.149) (1.127) 
Traditional 18yrs 51.142*** 17.742*** 51.951*** 13.135*** 
 (1.013) (1.021) (0.991) (0.972) 
After Bright Futures 6.844*** 12.952*** 2.519** 3.283*** 
 (0.987) (1.016) (1.182) (1.173) 
Institutional dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
Demographic controls 
and time trend 
NO NO YES YES 
    
R-squared 0.952 0.960 0.955 0.964 
     
Observations 146,305 148,810 146,297 148,802 
          
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Monetary values are expressed in 2002 dollars. Demographic controls include gender, 
race/ethnicity, citizenship, limited English proficiency. 
  
We then interacted the treatment indicator with the institutional dummies following 
equation 2, and again found that the state weighted average masks fundamental variation in 
behavioral responses across institutions. Figures 3 and 4 show the 28 institutional treatment 
effects, the 1 standard error bounds, a no effect line at 0, and the state-level weighted average 
when each test score is used as a dependent variable (Table 6, columns 3 and 4). The effect of 
the introduction of the FBFS on the math test scores of community college students was not 
statistically significant for nine institutions, but for the remaining nineteen it was clearly defined 
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as either positive or negative, and it ranged from gains of 30 points to losses of 20 points (SAT 
math scores units). Statistical differences for English test scores from Figure 4 were less evident.  
 
Figure 3:  
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Note: Dependent variable is math test score. No effect line is set at 0. The weighted average 
comes from table 5, column 3. Institutional treatment effects are estimated according to equation 
2. Confidence intervals that touch the no effect line at 0 are not statistically significant at a 5 
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Note: Dependent variable is English test score. No effect line is set at 0. The weighted average 
comes from table 5, column 4. Institutional treatment effects are estimated according to equation 
2. Confidence intervals that touch the no effect line at 0 are not statistically significant at a 5 
percent level ( 1 standard error). 
 
 
The institutional treatment effects in Figures 3 and 4 are drawn against the distance to the 
closest four-year public university as a measure of the competition within the community 
college’s educational marketplace.
12
 This relation between college choice and college location is 
more formally explored in a multilevel setting in Table 7. We extracted all 28 institutional 
treatment effects from equation 2 and used them as dependent variables in a regression on 
institutional level predictors (Gelman & Hill, 2006). First, we estimated the effect of measures of 
competition within the educational marketplace, such as the distance to the closest four-year 
public college and the number of institutions in a 50-mile radius; then we used group-level 
                                                 
12
 The distance is computed using the ZIP codes of Florida community colleges and of Florida four-year colleges 
and universities. It is measured in straight miles and does not take into account driving distance. 
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predictors like the total number of FTE students, the mean state revenues per FTE, and the mean 
budget per FTE (1995-2000, CPI adjusted). Only the distance to the closest four-year public 
college had a statistically significant impact on institutional treatment effects, although for the 
rest of the variables the direction of the effect was as expected. Hence, we conclude that distance 
to the closest four-year public competitor is the main determinant of losing or gaining high-test-
score students. This result confirms the hypothesis that distance is an important predictor for 
college choice and enrollment (Long, 2004b; Rouse, 1995). Due to incentives generated by the 
merit aid program, high ability students were more likely to switch to a public university if a 
four-year college was within a reasonable commuting distance. 
 
Table 7: 




Math test score 
coefficients 
Verbal test score 
coefficients 
















Total FTE students (per 1,000) 
-0.480* -0.146* 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Mean state revenues per FTE (1995-
2000, CPI adjusted) 
0.003 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) 




      
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Monetary values are expressed in 2002 dollars. Each 
row is a separate regression with 28 institutions/observations. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the institutional behavioral responses of public-two year 
institutions to the introduction of a merit aid scholarship program in the state of Florida. We find 
no support among Florida community colleges for the Bennett hypothesis, which holds that 
institutions will increase tuition and other fees in order to capture the rents from a new aid 
program, and we note that public institutions have generally limited flexibility to modify their 
tuition and fees. Moreover, in contrast with the crowding-out hypothesis, which asserts that 
colleges are likely to reduce the amount of institutional aid they provide when a new source of 
financial aid becomes available, community colleges in Florida increased institutional financial 
aid for eligible students after the implementation of the Florida Bright Futures Scholarship. One 
plausible explanation for this finding is that institutions use the Bright Futures program as an 
―ability marker‖ and were willing to provide institutional aid to make up any amount of tuition 
not covered by the merit scholarship program. However, the state-level weighted average 
estimates mask fundamental variations across institutions. We find positive and negative 
institutional level effects, ranging from an increase in $250 in institutional aid per student to a 
$100 reduction in institutional financial aid. 
Finally, we find no statistical evidence for the re-sorting hypothesis which posits that the 
state community college system loses high ability students as a result of the implementation of 
the Bright Futures program. However, our results also confirm the inappropriateness of a state-
weighted average treatment effect for the change in average test scores at community colleges. 
The analysis of institutional treatment effects suggests that some community colleges gained 
higher ability students after FBFS was introduced—with a maximum gain of 30 points in 
average math test scores—while other two-year colleges lost higher ability students—with a 
college losing as much as 20 points in the average math test scores. The shift of Florida students 
away from community colleges as a result of the FBFS program seems to be statistically 
associated with measures of the level of competition within each community college’s 
educational marketplace, such as the distance to the closest public four-year college.  
 In conclusion, this study finds that community colleges respond to the economic 
incentives created by the introduction of a merit aid program by modifying their institutional 
financial aid policies, on average, in unexpected ways. Our study also suggests that students 
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modify their college choice decisions after a new source of financial aid becomes available, but 
that the new program appears to affect the behavior of only those students residing in 
competitive higher education markets. Whether or not this re-sorting mechanism is a desirable 
consequence is a question that should be evaluated in terms of social returns. Nonetheless, 
policymakers should be aware of the heterogeneity of responses among institutions and students 
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